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Abstract
We investigate whether the form of exit is triggered by the form of
entry and technical expertise, an exercise which has been persistently
missing in the literature, for a sample of 121 firms in the LAN switch
industry. We find that pre-entry experience, technical expertise, and in-
tangible assets are important determinants of firm survival. Extending
the analysis to the case of heterogeneous exit, we find that firms with
high pre-entry experience and higher technical expertise are more likely
to exit by acquisition than by failure. Conversely, possessing a larger in-
tangible capital and previous experience in related markets does not lead
to a higher probability of being acquired.
1 Introduction
This paper analyses the relationship between entry, innovativeness and exit. In
most works, firm exit is captured by the firm’s disappearance from census data.
It is then considered as the consequence of poor economic performance, the
latter being the firm’s lack of financial resources and/or innovative capabilities.
However, to equate firm exit with poor performance may simply be wrong. We
argue that the form of exit must be accounted for, because exit by acquisition
cannot be treated as exit by bankruptcy. Whereas the latter must definitely
be viewed as a failure, the former conceals a positive valuation by the acquir-
ing company. Should this be the case, factors explaining firm exit may vary
depending on whether one looks at exit by acquisition or exit by mere failure.
This research is carried out on a sample of 121 firms in the LAN switch indus-
try, a sub-sector of the data communication industry in the 1990s. During this
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period,the LAN switch industry has experienced a rapid and sustained growth
characterized by a high rate of firm entry and exit. Innovations have constantly
moved forward the technological frontier and have generated opportunities for
new firms to enter and challenge the existing leadership. Incumbents often
reacted to the challenges by acquiring those firms who possessed the capabili-
ties and the knowledge which threaten them. As a consequence a considerable
number of exits witnessed during the 1990s were due to acquisitions.
We use information on the ’fate’ of firms as firm failure, firm buy-out or
mere survival. Having data on the founders’ background to identify the forms
of entry as spin-out, start-ups and diversifiers, we investigate whether the form
of exit is triggered by the form of entry, an exercise which has been persistently
missing in the literature. Moreover, all firms in our sample are ’innovative’
in the sense that they have introduced at least one switch equipment during
the 1990s. Information on product characteristics is used to describe the firm
location on a quality scale. This provides information on the firms’ technical
expertise and is used as an explanatory variable to predict exit. For all firms
we have information on their date of entry and exit from the switch industry.
This provides us with the opportunity to develop duration models of two types.
First, we estimate a discrete time duration model to understand when exit is
considered to be a homogeneous event. Then we consider alternative types of
exit such as failure and acquisitions, by means of a multinomial logit competing
risk model.
The paper is organized as follows. Next Section provides a review of the lit-
erature as well as the necessary background information on the LAN switch in-
dustry. In Sections 3 and 4 we develop the econometric model, describe the data
sources and the variables that will be used on the empirical analysis. Section 5
presents and discusses the results. Conclusions of the analysis are presented in
Section 6.
2 Literature Review and Industry Background
The existing literature on entry and exit is extensive. Empirical studies point to
firm size, age and market selection, among others, as important determinants
of industrial dynamics [5, 2]. Mata and Portugal [21] and Mata et al. [22],
provide evidence on the complex nature of the relationship between firm age
and survival. While the probability of survival seems to increase for old firms,
the relationship is not definite for young firms. Honjo [13] investigates the post-
entry performance of a sample of Japanese firms. He finds a negative effect of
firm size on exit due to business failure and a positive one for firm age. In this
paper we take a broader stance at the issue of the determinants of entry and
exit by looking at the relationships between form of entry, innovativeness and
form of exit.
The idea that the ’fate’ of firms should be linked to innovative activity is
not new and several contributions both theoretical and empirical have made this
point. At the theoretical level, Ericson and Pakes [6] extend Jovanovic [16] to
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allow for ’active learning’ and R&D heterogeneity among firms. They predict
that high rate of innovation and uncertainty should be associated with high rate
of exit. Klepper [19] provides another interpretation. His model predicts that
time of entry interact with prior experience and with age to condition the hazard
of exit. At the empirical level, in his review of determinants of entry, Geroski [10]
has pointed out how innovation and firm survival should be strongly and directly
linked. Audretsch [1] has found that firms in more innovative industries show
lower probability of survival soon after entry and a higher probability after they
survive a certain amount of years. Cefis and Marsili [3] find that after controlling
for age and size, innovative firms are more likely to survive than non innovative
firms. Beside these contributions there is an enormous amount of management
oriented literature that links firm survival with both the timing [4] and the
strategy of innovation [23, 34]. All in all, these studies point to the presence of
a premium associated with survival for innovative firms. However, few analyses
exist on firms that are innovative but fail to survive and few contributions have
investigated the links between innovation and form of exit.
The empirical literature on the form of exit is rare and scanty. In her seminal
work, Schary [29] finds that profitability is a weak determinant of the form of exit
and that firms’ characteristics (i.e. mainly related to capital structure) should
be taken into account. Moreover, the predictive power of firms’ characteristic
varies depending on the form of exit. Another work has taken up these findings
and explicitly considered both industry and firm level determinants of firm exit.
Perez et al. [26] for instance perform a competing risk analysis on a sample of
manufacturing firms in Spain. They find differences in the determinants of exit
depending upon the form of exit (i.e. exit due to business failure as opposed to
acquisition). In particular, the risk of failure declines with age and size, while
the risk of being acquired seems to increase.
Though they provide interesting insights into the nature and causes of differ-
ent form of exit, none of these contributions explicitly address the relationship
between innovativeness and form of exit. In this paper, we want explore the
possibility that the form of firm exit can be explicitly linked to firm innovative-
ness. A strong argument in favor of the hypothesis that innovative firms are
more likely to exit by acquisition can be made on the basis of the resource based
theory of the firm [25]. By innovating, firms signal that they possess certain ca-
pabilities. In particular contexts characterized by rapid technical change, such
as the LAN switch market, competitors may find in need of those capabilities
and choose to get them by acquiring existing firms instead of developing them
[28, 17]. In this case, exit by acquisition is a consequence of the firms being
innovative and signals success rather than failure.
Finally, it has to be noted that innovation may also be related to the form of
entry. Recently the literature has focused on the relationship between the form
of entry and the firm performance in terms of survival. As stressed by Helfat
and Lieberman [12], spin-outs may take advantage of assets like industry-specific
knowledge embodied in firms founders and transferred from the previous em-
ployee and should be more performing than other firms. For a rather large
sample of firms in Denmark, Eriksson and Kuhn [7] find evidence of lower risk
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of failure for spin-outs as opposed to other types of firms. Franco and Filson
[9] confirm these findings in the case of spin-outs in the Hard Disk Drive in-
dustry. In his historical analysis of the shipbuilding industry, Thompson [33]
finds a positive relationship between pre-entry experience and the survival of
firms. Indeed, once controlled for this source of heterogeneity, the dependence
of survival on age and firms size disappears. Although very important for their
implications for the study of the determinants of industrial dynamics, none of
these contributions have explicitly addressed the relationship between form of
entry and form of exit. Those that did, usually treated exit as a ’homogenous’
event.
This paper presents an empirical investigation of entry and exit in the Local
Area Network (LAN) switch equipment industry. The LAN switch industry
began in the 1990 with the invention of the first switch for data communication.
Entry in the industry was initially slow but it dramatically increased starting
from 1993. Three different types of firms fueled the entry process. First, we had
incumbents from established markets (i.e. routers and hubs) within the LAN
industry. Second, there were incumbents from outside the industry but with
previous experience either in telecom, in semiconductor, or computer industry.
Third, there were new firms searching for new opportunities. These firms were
generally highly innovative and founded wither by entrepreneurs who were for-
mer academics or by entrepreneurs who were former employees in the industry.
Entry was accompanied by an evolution of the technology which culminated
in the opening up of two market segments. In the high-end segment there were
products characterized by high performance targeted to customers with large
networks. In the low-end segment there were less performing switches targeted
to customers with small networks. The nature of the competition in the two
types of market segments was different. In the low-end segment, manufacturers
competed mainly on price. In the high-end segment, competition was mainly
based on constant search for technical excellence and increasing performance.
Polarisation led to consolidation and to an increase of the rate of exit. Among
the firms who exited the industry, the majority consisted of new firms which
ended up being acquired by existing incumbents. Indeed for many of the new
firms the opening up of the switch market had represented at the beginning the
opportunity to enter a new niche. However, it was clear from the start that
there were little chances of turning the new venture into a large firm. Indeed, in
many cases firms had been ’designed to be acquired from the start’ generating
an entirely new business model called ’the acquisition-as-exit-strategy’ business
model ([18]: 234)1.
In this paper we look at this phase of growth and consolidation of the LAN
switch industry and at the dynamics of entry and exit. By carrying out such an
analysis, we aim at gaining a better understanding of the relationship between
forms of entry, innovativeness and forms of exit. In particular, we examine the
following propositions. First, we expect entry by firms with pre-entry experi-
ence to be positively associated with the probability to survive. For those firms
which exit, pre-entry experience should increase the probability to be acquired.
Second, we expect firm technical expertise as measured by the distance to tech-
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nological frontier to be positively associated with the probability to survive or
to be acquired, for those firms who exit. Third, there is a positive relation-
ship between the quality of the stock of knowledge and capabilities available
to firms and the probability of exiting by acquisition. Fourth, previous inno-
vative experience and first mover advantage are positively associated with firm
survival.
3 Econometric Models
We develop two sets of econometric models to evaluate the factors that affect
firm exit. First we estimate a standard discrete time duration model to explain
the probability of exit; second we apply a competing risk model accounting for
heterogeneity in firm exit.
In the first set of models, we estimate a duration model for grouped data
following the approach first introduced by Prentice and Gloeckler [27]. Suppose
there are firms i = 1, . . . , N , who enter the industry at time t = 0. The hazard
rate function for firm i at time t > 0 and t = 1, , T is assumed to take the
proportional hazard form: λit = λ0(t) ·X ′itβ, where λ0 (t) is the baseline hazard
function and Xit is a series of time-varying covariates summarizing observed
differences between firms. The discrete time formulation of the hazard of exit
for firm i in time interval t is given by a complementary log logistic function
such as:
ht (Xit) = 1− exp
{
− exp
(
X
′
itβ + θ(t)
)}
(1)
where θ(t) is the baseline hazard function relating the hazard rate ht (Xit) at
the tth interval with the spell duration [14].
This model can be extended to account for unobserved but systematic dif-
ferences between firms. Suppose that unobserved heterogeneity is described by
a random variable εi independent of Xit. The proportional hazards form with
unobserved heterogeneity can now be written as :
ht (Xit) = 1− exp
{
− exp
(
X
′
itβ + θ(t)
)
+ εi
}
(2)
where εi is an unobserved individual-specific error term with zero mean, uncor-
related with the X’s. Model (2) can be estimated using standard random effects
panel data methods for a binary dependent variable, under the assumption that
some distribution is provided for the unobserved term. In our case, we will
assume that the εi are distributed normal and Gamma. Assuming that εi is
Gamma distributed with mean one and variance v, the log-likelihood function
is written:
logL =
N∑
i=1
log (1− ci) ·Ai + ci ·Bi (3)
where
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Ai =
[
1 + v
Ti∑
ti=1
exp
(
X
′
itβ + θ(t)
)]−(1/v)
and
Bi =
[
1 + v
Ti−1∑
ti=1
exp
(
X
′
itβ + θ(t)
)]−(1/v)
, if ti > 1 or
Bi = 1−Ai , if ti = 1.
where ci is an indicator variable taking unity for firms exiting the market, 0
otherwise,and ti is the discrete time hazard rate for person i in each duration
interval ti = 1, . . . , Ti. The parameters v and β are to be estimated. Note that
the proportional hazards form without heterogeneity is the limiting case as v →
0. The relevance of the estimated unobserved heterogeneity is tested directly
by the significance of parameter v. Besides, we also perform a likelihood ratio
test between the unrestricted model (with unobserved heterogeneity) and the
restricted model (without unobserved heterogeneity). The reported estimates
are chosen from the LR test.
In the second set of models, we relax the assumption of homogeneous exit
by accounting for the form of exit, namely mere firm failure, and firm buy-
out. The extension of the standard pooled duration model to two exit forms is
referred to as the competing risks model (CRM) [15]. The two destinations are
treated as independent, so the probability of exit by failure is assumed not to
depend on the probability of exit by acquisition. We consider that these two
alternatives can in fact be viewed as opposite, one pointing to a positive event
(firm buy-out), the other pointing to the lack of economic viability (firm failure).
In practical terms, the independent competing risk framework treats both exits
as right censored [20, 15]. That is, we estimate the following complementary
log logistic model similar to 1, but where the full set of parameters is allowed
to vary according the different destinations:
ht (Xijt) = 1− exp
{
− exp
(
X
′
itβj + θj(t)
)}
(4)
where, in our case j = 1 or 2 respectively, depending on the mode of exit. Fi-
nally, a cautionary note about the interpretation of the coefficient estimates. In
CRM models, interpretations of the coefficients are not always as straightfor-
ward as in the case of the pooled model because the results depend on all the
parameters in the model. If the CRM has a proportional hazard form, as is the
case in Eq.4, then an increase in X will increase the conditional probability to
exit, for instance by firm failure if the estimated coefficient for the hazard rate
of firm failure is larger than the corresponding coefficient for the hazard rate of
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firm buy-out [31]. If we assume that we have intrinsically discrete time data,
Eq.4 can be estimated using a ’multinomial logit’ competing risk model.
We also test whether the two forms of exit, firm failure and firm buy-
out, are behaviourally distinct rather than simply incidental. This is equiv-
alent to the null hypothesis of equality of all parameters (except intercepts
in the models for the destination-specific hazard). Narendranathan and Stew-
art [24] show that for continuous time PH models, a test of whether exits to
different states are behaviourally distinct (rather than simply incidental) cor-
responds to a particular set of restrictions: equality of all parameters except
intercepts in the models for the destination-specific hazards. The test statis-
tic is 2[ln (LCR)− ln (LSR)−
∑
j nj ln (pj)], where ln(LCR) is the maximised
log-likelihood from the competing risk model (the sum of those from the com-
ponent models), ln(LSR) is the maximised log-likelihood from the single-risk
model, nj is the number of exits to state j and pj = nj/
∑
j nj , where there
are j = 1, . . . , j destination states. This test statistic is distributed Chi-squared
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions.
4 Data
We investigate a sample of 121 firms in the LAN switch industry. All firms
in our sample are ’innovative’ in the sense that they have introduced at least
one switch equipment starting from 1990, the year the first switch has been
marketed. For each firm in our dataset we have information on: date of entry
and exit from the switch industry, number of switches introduced, number of
products
introduced in other segments of the LAN industry such as the router and
the hub segment, number of patents granted. For each new switch introduced
we have information on its price and technical characteristics. Information
on firm entry and exit date was gathered from a variety of sources such as
the D&B Million Dollar Database and Lexis-Nexis. To gather information on
the background of the firms and their founders we searched publicly available
databases that aggregate news and press releases such as ABI-Inform as well as
annual reports gathered from the Thomson Research (Global Access) database.
Information on the type of exit (i.e. whether a firm survived or exited ei-
ther by acquisition or failure at the end of the period) was instead obtained by
looking at announcements in the specialized trade press and at the information
contained in the CORPTECH database. Data on product characteristics and
prices for switches as well as for hubs and routers were obtained from an orig-
inal dataset of 1825 LAN products (536 switches, 535 hubs, and 754 routers)
marketed between 1990 and 1999). The dataset was constructed using informa-
tion from specialized trade journals (Network World and Data Communications)
that periodically publish Buyers’ Guides and details on new product introduc-
tions. This information has been double checked, with press communications
and product announcements released by manufacturers. In our analysis we de-
cided to consider only those manufacturers who marketed four or more products
7
in the period 1990-1999. After consolidation we are left with 121 firms who mar-
keted a total of 503 switch products. Finally, information on patents granted
was retrieved from the USPTO Database.
4.1 Forms of Entry and Forms of Exit
We use information on pre-entry experience and founders’ background to assign
to firms a status according to their mode of entry. In particular, we define
SPIN-OUT as those firms whose main line of business is the LAN industry but
founder(s) were already employed in the LAN industry in the year(s) prior to
the founding of the new company. This includes also those cases in which the
new firm does not entertain any type of formal relationship with the parent.
We define START-UP as those firms whose founder(s) had no prior experience
in the LAN industry or no entrepreneurial experience at all at time of founding
but whose main line of business is in the LAN industry. Finally, we define
DIVERSIFIER as those firms whose founder(s) had no prior experience in the
LAN industry and whose main line of business was outside the LAN industry
(i.e. computer, semiconductor etc.) at the time of entry into switch market.
All types of firms might have already been operating in the LAN industry when
entry in the switch market occurred.
This distinction, which is based on technological experience before entry
occurred, can be used to glean some preliminary evidence on the relationship
between pre-entry experience and performance in terms of survival. Figure 1
below draws the proportion of surviving firms according to the number of years
after entry, distinguishing by mode of entry. We observe the following.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Diversifiers display the highest survival rate after entry with more than 40%
of firms surviving at the end of the period. Start-ups and spin-outs trail behind
with the former that seem to survive longer than the latter. It is interesting
to notice that start-ups experience a higher rate of survival than Diversifier in
the first five years after entry thus suggesting that being experienced might be
important particularly just after entry has occurred.
This evidence seems inconsistent with previous results which stress the ad-
vantages of pre-entry experience in terms of survival [33]. Spin-outs and start-
ups benefit from a higher pre-entry experience and should display higher survival
rates after entry into the switch market. Klepper [19] argues that at a given
age, early entrants and firms with pre-entry experience should display a higher
survival rate than late entrants and firms with no experience. However, though
spin-outs and start-ups are more experienced, they are generally younger than
Diversifiers. In other words, firm age might account for the accumulation of
physical, human and organizational capital which, although not necessarily re-
lated to the LAN industry, might influence firm performance in terms of survival.
To control for this hypothesis we interact the firm status with AGE at time of
entry. To account for the time of entry we include in the duration models a
vector of entry-year dummy variables.
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One of the basic ideas underlying this paper is that pre-entry experience
enhances firms’ performance in terms of survival. However, for innovative firms,
being experienced is a ’double edged sword’ in the sense that possession of
specific capabilities makes them liable to being bought-out by competitors. This
is particularly true in contexts, such as the LAN switch industry, characterized
by rapid technical change in which competitors do not have time to develop
the capabilities to catch up with innovators. We identify three possible modes
of exit: Failure (i.e. bankruptcy), Buying-out (i.e. acquisition), and Survival.
Table 1 reports the relationship between modes of entry and modes of exit for
the firms in our sample. We note two things.
[Table 1 about here.]
First, more than two thirds (69%) of the firms in our sample exit the LAN
switch industry after entry. Of those exiting the majority consists of spin-outs
followed by start-ups. Second, both spin-outs and start-ups exit mostly by
acquisition. Among survivors, Spin-out and Start-up display the largest share
of the total although almost half of the Diversifier survives. This preliminary
evidence suggests that although firms with higher pre-entry experience make up
most of the total survivors, those that exit generally tend to be bought-out thus
suggesting that their fate may be linked to their status and that exit should
not be rated as a homogenous event. The Chi-square statistics is not significant
leading us to retain the null hypothesis of independence between modes of entry
and mode of exit. However, this result should be interpreted with care due to
low expected frequencies.
4.2 Quality Frontier
In this paper, we argue that post entry performance is mainly linked to pre-entry
experience but that in the case of innovative firms technical expertise should be
considered an important explanatory variable of the fate of firms when exit is
not considered to be a homogenous event. We measure technical expertise in
terms of firm location with respect to the technological frontier at time of entry.
Location in the space of product characteristics has already been linked to firm
exit in the literature [30, 32].
We represent the location of product in a vertical space using the generic
technological characteristics of the products in the switch market. Indeed for
each product our dataset reports information on its technical characteristics,
date of market introduction and list price. To measure distances from the
quality frontier we follow Stavins [30] and proceed in two steps. In the first
step, we reduce the multi-attribute structure (the technological characteristics)
to a single dimensional measure of product quality. Assuming independence
across product technological attributes, we project them onto a linear scale as
follows:
qm =
∑
j
βj · zjm (5)
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Eq.5 suggests that quality q of model m can be measured as the weighted
sum of its characteristics. The weights βj represent the marginal value of char-
acteristic j that both consumers and producers place on the jth attribute. Such
weights are approximated by regressing observed prices, deflated into 1996 US
dollars using the sector specific deflator for telecommunication equipment pro-
vided by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis:
pmit = α+
∑
j
βj · zjm + αt + εmit (6)
where pmit is the log is the observed price for model m introduced in the market
by firm i at time t, α is a constant and αt is a time fixed effect. Table 2 provides
the results from the hedonic regression. With almost 70% of the variance of
prices explained, the overall fit is satisfactory enough although a substantial
part of the observed prices (30%) is due to factors other than those introduced
in the regression. This may in turn be due to omitted product attributes and
erroneous pricing reflecting changes in demand.
[Table 2 about here.]
Whereas the observed prices embody error measurements reflecting various
factors such as changes in demand, promotional discounts and other non-quality
components [30], the predicted price pˆ reflects by construction the quality q of
the product. Thus we posit:
qmit = pˆmit (7)
Eq.7 says that ranking predicted prices is tantamount to ranking products
according to their quality. However, in order to more properly account for
product quality, we amend Eq.6 in two ways. First in Eq.6 the estimated weights
are constrained to be constant overtime, whereas the technology is the Switch
market is likely to have evolved over time. This suggests that depending on
significant changes in product quality in the nineties, the pooled regression may
produce inexact weights. Therefore, we interact all explanatory variables with
year dummy variables, in order to allow the weights βj to vary with time. Second
we include a firm fixed effect µi to control for heterogeneity in the firms’ pricing
practices.
For example, positive values of µi can be interpreted as persistent over-
pricing, i.e. a firm mark-up beyond and above the marginal utility (from the
consumer’s viewpoint) or marginal product (from the producer’s viewpoint).
The important point here is that values of µi provide information on the firms’
pricing practices, not on product quality. Therefore, we subtract µi from the
predicted price pˆ. Taking stocks of the previous paragraph, we amend Eqs.6
and 7 as follows:
p
′
mit = α+
∑
t
∑
j
βtj · (ztjm × αt) + αt + µi + εmit (8)
10
q
′
mit = pˆ
′
mit − µi (9)
Including the full vector of explanatory variables as specified in Eq.8 yields
an increased r2 of 0.85, implying that accounting for changes in the marginal
values of product characteristics and firm mark-ups explains a significant share
of the variance of observed prices in the LAN Switch market.
In the second step, we use the estimated product quality q
′
to compute
distances of products from the quality frontier, that is, we rank products on a
vertical product space. To do so, we compute for every product its distance
from the quality frontier as follows:
dfmit = max
(
q
′
t
)
− q′mit (10)
where q
′
mit is the quality of model m by firm i in year t. The higher d
f
mit,
the farther the product is from the quality frontier. Again, because firms can
introduce several products in a given year, we computed for each firm the DIS-
TANCE FROM FRONTIER as: dfit = min
[
dfmit
]
it
. Both this measure and its
square are used as explanatory variables.
4.3 Control Variables
Additional explanatory variables are intended to capture the role of intangi-
ble capital and firm size. We measure intangible capital in terms of patents
(PATENT STOCK). This variable is constructed as the logarithm of the simple
count of the total number of patents held by firms at time of entry, as retrieved
from the NBER U.S. Patent Citation Database [11]2. The size variable (SIZE)
is constructed as the logarithm of the sum of the total number of products in-
troduced in the Router and Hub market when entry occurred. To the extent to
what the number of products influences firms’ revenues, we may consider it also
a sensible proxy for size. Lastly, we define AGE as the number of years since
the firm was institutionally born. This is different from works using census data
where the age of the firm is generally grasped by the number of years in the
census (i.e.dataset). AGE has a fixed value equal to the age of the firm at time
of entry in the industry. Thus, AGE measures pre-entry experience.
[Table 3 about here.]
Summary descriptive statistics for these explanatory variables are reported
in Table 33.In all the regressions, we consider 121 firms, of which 83 eventually
exit the industry. All variables take values at the time when the firm enters the
idnustry, including AGE. All duration models include a full vector of entry-year
dummy variables. Expanding the dataset by time intervals yields a total of 600
observations.
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5 Results
To understand the impact of pre-entry experience on firms’ performance several
models have been estimated considering first exit as a homogeneous event. We
use a discrete time duration model with a Weibull hazard function. In this
model the explanatory variables are introduced in sequence and exit is treated
as homogeneous. Then we check the robustness of our analysis by employing
different types of hazard functions and controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
Finally, we extend the analysis to account
for heterogeneity of exit by estimating a ’multinomial logit’ competing risk
model.
5.1 Homogeneous Exit
Five models have been estimated using a discrete time duration model with a
Weibull hazard function (see Table 4). In the first models we look at the impact
of pre-entry experience alone. We then add sequentially AGE, firm location in
the product space (DISTANCE FROM FRONTIER and (DISTANCE FROM
FRONTIER)2, intangible capital (PATENT STOCK) and economies of scope
(SIZE).
[Table 4 about here.]
Column (1) and (2) report the results for our main variables together with
the baseline hazard function. In column (1) pre-entry experience does not seem
to significantly impact on the probability of exit whereas when interacting the
same variable with firms’ age, some coefficients become significant. In particular,
in column (2) the negative and significant coefficients of AGE × SPIN-OUT and
AGE × DIVERSIFIER indicate that this type of firms have a lower probability
of leaving the industry. It has to be noted that the sign of these coefficients does
not change across subsequent specifications. Only the coefficient of AGE × DI-
VERSIFIER remains persistently significant, implying that diversifiers benefit
more from past-experience than spin-outs and start-ups.
The impact of technical expertise as measured by firms’ location with respect
to the technological frontier is estimated in column (3). DISTANCE FROM
FRONTIER enters positively thus suggesting that only firms capable to locate
close to the frontier survive. However, the relationship between location in the
product space and survival is non linear. Indeed, the negative and significant
coefficient of (DISTANCE FROM FRONTIER)2 suggests that exits mainly oc-
cur among firms located in the ’middle of the market’. This well reflects the
situation in the switch market during the 1990s which was polarized between
a high-end and a low-end [8]. At the high end of the market firms compete to
be on the frontier and those that lag behind do not survive. At the low end
competition occurs at the boundaries with the high-end of the market where
firms struggle to survive while firms serving niches at the bottom of the low end
have a higher probability of surviving. Interestingly, when adding the contri-
bution of firm location in the product space, the coefficient of the SPIN-OUT
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dummy becomes significant, thus suggesting that firms with high pre-entry ex-
perience have relatively lower probability of exiting the industry with respect
to Diversifiers.
We then control for the contribution of intangible capital stock and size
separately. In column (4) we add the variable PATENT STOCK. The coefficient
is negative and significant suggesting that possessing a higher stock of intangible
capital reduces the probability of leaving the industry. It is interesting to note
that with the inclusion of this variable also the START-UP dummy becomes
significant thus confirming the importance of pre-entry experience. SIZE is
added in column (5). The variable enters positively but not significantly and
suggests that firms’ size does not pay a significant role as determinant of the
probability of exit. This result conflicts with most of the existing literature
on firm survival. However, since it accounts for the total number of products
introduced at time of entry, this is a measure of economies of scope rather than
size, and it accounts for the role of experience in related markets.
Altogether our results confirm that the sample is behaving as expected. In
particular, we observe two things. First, pre-entry experience mainly reduces
the probability of exit when exit is considered a homogeneous event. Age also
impacts positively on firms’ survival but significantly only in the case of firms
with limited pre-entry experience. Both results are consistent with previous
findings [19, 33]. Second, firms with high technical expertise, as measured by
their location with respect to the technological frontier, have a better post entry
performance in terms of probability of surviving, though the relationship is not
linear. Possessing intangible capital increases the probability of surviving while
firms’ size does not seem to play an important role.
We provide a sensitivity analysis for these results in Table 5 where alter-
native specifications of column (5) are reported. We carry out two types of
robustness check. First, we explore different specifications of the baseline haz-
ard function. The polynomial specification in column (6) substantially confirms
our previous results, where both the sign and magnitude of the parameter esti-
mates are stable. The non parametric specification is reported in column (7).
This type of specification makes no assumption about the shape of the baseline
hazard function by introducing a full vector of year dummy variables, instead of
constraining the effect of duration to be monotonic (Column 5) or polynomial
(Column 6). Again the signs and significance levels of the coefficients are very
stable, confirming the good robustness of our results with respect to different
assumptions on the duration effect.
[Table 5 about here.]
Second we control for unobserved heterogeneity by estimating a standard
random effect model for binary dependent variable with error terms. Estimates
reported in column (9) assume that error terms are normally distributed. When
compared to the previous models, this specification yields similar results con-
cerning the sign of coefficients. Both START-UP and SPIN-OUT lose their
significance at 5 percent level although the size of these coefficients is substan-
tially higher than in our reference model. In column (10) we assume that the
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firm-specific terms are distributed gamma. In this specification all the explana-
tory variables lose significance although the direction of the parameter estimates
remain consistent. Only our proxy for technical expertise (DISTANCE FROM
FRONTIER2) remains weakly significant. The test for significant frailty (LR
frailty test) suggests that unobserved heterogeneity is not important in our sam-
ple.Therefore in what follows, we concentrate on heterogeneous exit without
addressing the question of unobserved heterogeneity.
5.2 Heterogenous Exit
We now consider exit as being a heterogeneous event. Mere firm exit may con-
ceal important insights on the form of exit. As argued above, in industries
characterised by rapid technical change where competitors may not have time
to develop their capabilities mergers and acquisitions are very frequent and they
cannot be considered as exit by failure. In these contexts it is likely that pre
entry experience, technical expertise, and intangible capital influence both sur-
vival and, for those firms that do not survive, the type of exit. Our short review
of the existing empirical literature shows that this crucial piece of information
is missing from many analyses of innovation and firms’ survival. To explore
the relationships between pre entry experience, innovativeness and firm survival
we ran a ’multinomial logit’ competing risk model (Table 6). For comparison
purposes, column (5) reports the coefficient from our previous Weibull hazard
rate estimation.
[Table 6 about here.]
Column (11) reports the results of the comparison between the alternatives
of exiting by failure and surviving. Coefficients for SPIN-OUT, START-UP, and
DIVERSIFIER interacted with AGE are all negative and significant indicating
that firms with pre-entry experience have a lower probability of exiting by failure
than surviving. It is interesting to note that for Spin-Outs and Start-ups, the
latter has the lowest coefficients, implying that firms with the highest pre-entry
experience within the industry have a higher chance of surviving. DISTANCE
FROM FRONTIER has a positive and significant coefficient suggesting that
indeed firms lagging behind in terms of technical expertise have a higher prob-
ability of exiting by failure than surviving. However, the relationship is non
linear as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient of (DISTANCE
FROM FRONTIER)2. Location in the middle of the quality scale is the most
dangerous game for firms, whereas locating either near the frontier or far from
the frontier may be the favoured response to escape competition. The coeffi-
cient of PATENT STOCK is positive and significant suggesting that firms with
a high stock of intangible capital are more likely to fail than survive, a result
somewhat unexpected which deserves further analysis. Finally SIZE, measured
as the total number of products introduced in related markets, is not significant.
Results of the comparison between exit by Buy-out and Survival are reported
in column (12). Again we find that technical expertise matters in the sense that
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firms locating far from the technical frontier have a higher probability of exiting
(in this case by being bought-out) than surviving as suggested by the positive
and significant coefficient of DISTANCE FROM FRONTIER. Major differences
with respect to the previous estimates are found in the significance and sign of
the coefficients of the variables related to pre-entry experience and intangible
capital respectively. The coefficient of START-UP is now weakly significant sug-
gesting that firms with ’intermediate’ pre-entry experience have a lower proba-
bility of being bought-out than surviving. The coefficient of PATENT STOCK
is now negative and strongly significant thus suggesting that possessing a large
patent portfolio protects firms against acquisition.
Finally, column (13) compares the two alternatives of exiting by buy-out and
exiting by failure. In this column, coefficients are the difference between those
in column (12) and those in column (11). Thus an increase in the coefficient
of the explanatory variables will increase the conditional probability to exit,
for instance by firm buy-out if the estimated coefficient for the hazard of firm
buy-out is larger than the corresponding coefficient for the hazards of firm fail-
ure. Interaction terms now exhibit a positive coefficient suggesting that, when
controlling for age, pre-entry experience increase the probability of exiting by
acquisition rather than failure. Since coefficients can be interpreted as log odd
ratios, they rank the impact of pre-entry experience on the forms of exit: Buy-
out versus failure), by type of entry. We observe that pre-entry experience for
Spin-Outs display the highest probability of exiting by acquisition, less so for
Start-ups. For Diversifiers, pre-entry experience protects again exit as a whole,
but seems to have no effect on the type of exit.
Both our measures of technical expertise change sign and lose some signif-
icance with respect to previous estimates. DISTANT FROM FRONTIER is
negative, though weakly significant, suggesting that only firms located close to
the frontier have a higher probability of being acquired than exiting by failure.
This is confirmed by the coefficient (DISTANCE FROM FRONTIER)2 which
is now positive and indicates that the probability of being acquired is high for
firms located very close to the frontier, decreases as distance increase and then
increases again for those firms located farther away. All in all, both results
confirm that acquisitions are mainly triggered by the need to acquire technical
expertise and are consistent with the polarized structure of the switch market
mentioned above. Finally, the coefficient of PATENT STOCK is again negative
and significant suggesting that the higher the stock of intangible asset the less
likely firms are to exit the industry by acquisition than by failure.
Altogether, these estimates provide new results that enrich our analysis and
shed some light on our initial hypotheses. Interestingly, when exit is treated
as a heterogeneous event pre-entry experience alone loses significance as a de-
terminant of the fate of firms while age becomes a ’mediating’ factor of firms’
post entry performance particularly important when comparing the hazard of
firm buy-out and firm failure. Concerning the impact of technical expertise
on post entry performance, we find support for our hypothesis. Being located
close to the frontier increases the probability of surviving. Moreover, among
the exiting firms, only those located close to the frontier are more likely to be
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acquired. Finally, our results suggest that the relationship between technical ex-
pertise and the fate of firms is non linear. We have found only partial support
for the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between the the stock
of knowledge and the probability of exiting by acquisition. On the contrary,
possessing a larger intangible capital generally increases the probability of sur-
viving. However, if exiting, firms with larger intangible capital fail, they are
not acquired. Our interpretation is that although large knowledge stocks may
make firms more appealing on the market, they also make firms more expensive
to buy. In a context where knowledge obsolescence is in fact extremely rapid,
this may in turn inhibit acquisitions. Finally, our analysis does not provide
support for the hypothesis that previous innovative experience in related fields
is associated to firm survival.
6 Conclusion
This paper has analysed the relationships between form of entry, innovativeness
and form of exit in the LAN switch industry a sub-sector of the data commu-
nication industry in the 1990s. First, we looked at the hazard rate of firms by
considering exit as a homogeneous event. We found that pre-entry experience,
technical expertise, and intangible assets are important determinants of firms’
survival. Second we have extended the analysis to the case of heterogeneous
exit. We found that, among those which exited, and once controlled for age,
firms with high pre-entry experience and higher technical expertise are more
likely to exit by acquisition than by failure. On the contrary, possessing better
intangible assets and previous production experience in related markets does
not lead to a higher probability of being acquired.
Our analysis has important implications for the existing literature on entry,
innovation and exit. First, we provide further support to the empirical litera-
ture on the importance of pre-entry experience as a determinant of post entry
performance and extend it to the case of heterogeneous exit. Second, we ex-
tend the empirical literature on the determinants of exit in turbulent industries.
Indeed, most of the existing contributions on this topic have focused on exit
from declining industries, mainly by lookingy at the financial determinants of
exit. By focussing on the LAN equipment industry our study provides insights
on the case of a highly innovative sector. Third, this paper also contributes to
the literature on innovation, acquisition and industrial dynamics. The existing
literature on innovation has looked at acquisitions mainly as a way of acquiring
knowledge and innovative capabilities that require time to be developed. Our
results stress that in a dynamic industry, acquisitions may be mainly finalized
at gaining positions in the market rather than at acquiring competences per se.
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Notes
1According to this business model, the new companies usually revolved around
a single innovative product or technology. Acquisition usually entailed the pur-
chase of new ones in stock swap and then the integration of the product as well
as of the technology. Cisco Systems, the leader in the LAN switch market is
one of the proponents of this strategy (Kenney and von Burg, [18] ; Mayer and
Kenney, 2004
2We do not weight patents by citation counts, due to problems of time trunc-
tion in the available dataset. Moreover, summing all patents may lead to an
overestimation of patents relevant for the LAN industry especially for diversi-
fiers, whose main line of business is outside the LAN industry. We have com-
puted alternative measures of intangible capital, notably by summing patents
related to technological field H04L12 only, which is the main technology used
in the industry. We find that the results are neither affected nor improved by
the use of these alternative measures.
3Information on more ’traditional’ indicators of firms’ size such as R&D
expenditure and total number of employee is available only for a subset of com-
panies , mainly survivors and those that were publicly traded at the time they
were acquired. Employing these measures in the regression is likely to introduce
a bias in the analysis.
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Table 1: The relationship between modes of entry and exit in the LAN industry
Failure Buying-out Survival Total
Start-up 7 19 13 39
4.8 21.9 12.2
Spin-out 5 41 16 62
7.7 34.8 19.5
Diversifier 3 8 9 20
2.5 11.2 6.3
Total 15 68 38 121
Expected frequencies in italics
To be interpreted with care due to the low expected frequencies
Chi-square statistics = 6.26 (P = 0.180)
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Table 2: OLS Regression on Observed Prices. Dependent Variable: Deflated
Product Price
Backplane Capacity 0.236
[0.036]***
Number of Ethernet Ports 0.09
[0.028]***
Number of Fast Ethernet Ports 0.04
[0.037]
Number of FDDI Ports 0.024
[0.060]
Number of Token Ring Ports 0.132
[0.046]***
Number of 100VG-AnyLAN Ports 0.248
[0.122]**
Number of ATM Ports 0.112
[0.042]***
Number of Gigabit Ethernet Ports 0.361
[0.055]***
VLANs Capability 0.394
[0.099]***
Chassis 0.899
[0.130]***
Fixed Configuration -0.222
[0.088]**
Constant 8.37
[0.389]***
Observations 503
R-squared 0.699
Standard errors in brackets
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Robust standard errors in brackets
Year dummy variables omitted for clarity
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Failure 121 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
Bought-out 121 0.56 0.49 0.00 1.00
Survivor 121 0.31 0.47 0.00 1.00
Spin-out 121 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00
Start-up 121 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Diversifier 121 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00
Age 121 9.61 12.54 1.00 84.00
Distance from frontier 121 2.30 1.05 0.00 4.69
(Distance from frontier)2 121 6.37 4.60 0.00 22.01
Patent stock (log) 121 1.39 2.20 0.00 9.99
Size (log) 121 0.72 1.02 0.00 3.47
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Table 4: Firm Entry and the Hazard Rate of Exit in the LAN Switch Industry
(N=600, Discrete Time Duration Model, Weibull Hazard Function)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time (Log) -0.810 -0.711 -0.678 -0.63 -0.627
[0.147]*** [0.153]*** [0.153]*** [0.154]*** [0.154]***
Spin-Out 0.448 -0.597 -1.105 -1.519 -1.486
[0.343] [0.592] [0.631]* [0.667]** [0.673]**
Start-Up 0.120 -0.926 -1.086 -1.571 -1.568
[0.363] [0.676] [0.695] [0.728]** [0.734]**
Age × Spin-Out -0.086 -0.058 -0.044 -0.053
[0.043]** [0.044] [0.043] [0.045]
Age × Start-Up -0.047 -0.056 -0.041 -0.055
[0.037] [0.038] [0.038] [0.043]
Age × Diversifier -0.062 -0.075 -0.067 -0.070
[0.025]** [0.027]*** [0.026]** [0.027]***
Dist. Frontier 0.833 0.985 0.947
[0.494]* [0.492]** [0.494]*
(Dist. Frontier) 2 -0.265 -0.308 -0.297
[0.120]** [0.120]** [0.120]**
Pat. Stock (Log) -0.202 -0.209
[0.076]*** [0.078]***
Size (Log) 0.117
[0.154]
Constant -1.996 -0.452 -0.326 0.543 0.583
[0.578]*** [0.774] [0.808] [0.864] [0.869]
Number of firms 121 121 121 121 121
Number of firm exit 83 83 83 83 83
Log-Likelihood -215.3 -208.1 -204.0 -200.0 -199.7
Chi-Square 51.7*** 66.1*** 74.4*** 82.4*** 83.0***
LR Chi-Square - 14.4*** 8.3** 8.0*** 0.6
Standard errors in brackets
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All duration models include a full vector of entry-year dummy variables, not
reported here for clarity.
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Table 5: Firm Entry and Hazard Rates of Exit in the LAN Switch Industry
(N=600). Checking Robustness of Discrete Time Duration Model
Hazard Rate Function Unobserved Heterogeneity
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Spin-out -1.486 -1.612 -1.551 -1.486 -1.621 -2.871
[0.673]** [0.676]** [0.676]** [0.673]** [0.894]* [2.321]
Start-Up -1.568 -1.663 -1.624 -1.568 -1.806 -2.703
[0.734]** [0.738]** [0.738]** [0.734]** [0.948]* [1.965]
Age × Spin-out -0.053 -0.045 -0.047 -0.053 -0.07 -0.002
[0.045] [0.046] [0.046] [0.045] [0.058] [0.092]
Age × Start-Up -0.055 -0.056 -0.054 -0.055 -0.056 -0.053
[0.043] [0.044] [0.044] [0.043] [0.049] [0. 066]
Age × Diversifier -0.070 -0.073 -0.071 -0.07 -0.076 -0.100
[0.027]*** [0.028]*** [0.027]*** [0.027]*** [0.032]** [0.069]
Dist. Frontier 0.947 1.007 1.012 0.947 1.185 1.677
[0.494]* [0.500]** [0.500]** [0.494]* [0.625]* [1.051]
(Dist. Frontier) 2 -0.297 -0.315 -0.314 -0.297 -0.366 -0.570
[0.120]** [0.122]*** [0.122]*** [0.120]** [0.153]** [0.327]*
Pat. Stock (Log) -0.209 -0.221 -0.220 -0.209 -0.26 -0.425
[0.078]*** [0.078]*** [0.078]*** [0.078]*** [0.098]*** [0.309]
Size (Log) 0.117 0.135 0.128 0.117 0.099 0.143
[0.154] [0.156] [0.156] [0.154] [0.189] [0.277]
Constant 0.583 0.450 -10.657 0.583 0.866 2.209
[0.869] [0.895] [1.054] [0.869] [1.111] [3.170]
Link Function C log-log C log-log C log-log Logistic C log-log C log-log
Number of Firms 121 121 121 121 121 121
Number of Firm Exit 83 83 83 83 83 83
Log Likelihood -199.7 -195.9 -193.4 -199.7 -199.7 -200.4
LR test for frailty - - - 0.00 0.46 2.27*
Baseline Hazard Function: (5) (8) (9) (10) Log of time (Weibull),(6) Polynomial of order 2,
(7) Non parametric
Distribution of Unobserved Heterogeneity: (8) (9) Normal, (10) Gamma
Standard errors in brackets
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All duration models include a full vector of entry-year dummy variables, not reported here for
clarity.
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Table 6: The Determinant of the forms of firm exit in the LAN Switch Industry
(N=600, Competing Risk Duration Model)
(5) (11) (12) (13)
Spin-Out -1.486 0.242 -1.368 -1.610
[0.673]** [1.060] [0.873] [1.280]
Start-Up -1.568 1.052 -1.558 -2.611
[0.734]** [1.235] [0.937]* [1.453]*
Age × Spin-Out -0.053 -0.357 -0.018 0.338
[0.045] [0.152]** [0.050] [0.157]**
Age × Start-Up -0.055 -0.227 -0.039 0.189
[0.043] [0.091]** [0.048] [0.101]*
Age × Diversifier -0.070 -0.077 -0.066 0.011
[0.027]*** [0.030]*** [0.035]* [0.044]
Dist. Frontier 0.947 3.653 1.008 -2.645
[0.494]* [1.290]*** [0.519]* [1.367]*
(Dist. Frontier) 2 -0.297 -0.906 -0.321 0.585
[0.120]** [0.302]*** [0.124]*** [0.322]*
Pat. Stock(Log) -0.209 0.383 -0.281 -0.664
[0.078]*** [0.119]*** [0.107]*** [0.154]***
Size (Log) 0.117 0.450 0.082 -0.368
[0.154] [0.286] [0.186] [0.329]
Constant 0.583 -4.682 0.708 5.390
[0.869] [1.834]** [0.926] [1.971***]
Log Likelihood -199.7 -234.80
Wald Test 30.51*** 57.16*** 31.70***
(5) Homogeneous Exit
(11) Failure vs. Survival
(12) Buying-out vs. Survival
(13) Buying-out vs.Failure
Robust standard errors in brackets
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All duration models include a full vector of entry-year dummy variables, not
reported here for clarity. Unreported baseline hazard function: Log of time
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Figure 1: Kalplan Meier Survival Estimates
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